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ABSTRACT

Increasing significance of the online consumer-to-consumer (C-2-C) auction market has amplified the need for buyers and
sellers to engage in transactions with anonymous counterparts. The sequence of paying first and then taking delivery,
introduces a great amount of risk for potential buyers. In order to mitigate this risk, online auction markets (OAMs) are
employing an assortment of governance mechanisms, of which reputation scoring and reporting systems are the most
popular. Researchers have found substantial evidence from theoretical models as well as empirical studies that higher the
reputation rating of a seller, higher the bid prices he/she receives. However, a review of the current literature suggests a
conspicuous absence of any standard classification of sellers in OAMs. Lack of such a classification hinders systematic
research and theory development. Therefore, a comprehensive classification of sellers, based on feedbacks, is proposed to
advance our understanding of online C-2-C auction market and to provide a basis for further research. In addition, the
proposed classification is hierarchical rather than monothetic in nature and hence, gives greater systemic power to the
classification. Toward demonstrating the classification’s systemic power, we present a propositional inventory developed
from the classification. We also discuss how the proposed classification accommodates current research and furthers theory
building in this research area.
Keywords

Online auction market (OAM), reputation, feedback, classification of sellers.
INTRODUCTION

Growth in the online market has increased the need for buyers and sellers to engage in transactions with unknown
counterparts [Houser and Wooders 2000]. Often in cases of online B-2-B (Business-to-Business) and B-2-C (Business-toConsumer) transactions, the buyers are at least familiar with the sellers. However, in case of C-2-C (Consumer-to-Consumer)
online auction markets (OAMs), both buyers and sellers are total strangers and their true identity is seldom known [Houser
and Wooders 2000; Livingston 2002; Zacharia et al. 2000]. Further, buyers have to solely rely on unknown sellers’
description of products, as buyers have no other means of finding the details of products that they are interested in. Moreover,
in such markets, it is not uncommon for payments to precede the delivery of products [Livingston 2002; Melnik and Alm
2002]. The sequence of paying first and then taking the delivery of products, often combined with little or no ability to
examine the product in advance, introduces a great amount of risk for potential buyers [Zacharia et al. 2000]. Buyers hardly
have any means of preventing the sellers from indulging in opportunistic acts [Shapiro 1983] and for most part rely on the
information provided by the sellers [Zacharia et al. 2000]. This situation creates asymmetrical distribution of information
whereby sellers, when compared to buyers, not only possesses far more information about the product but also have the
opportunity to withhold information critical to the transaction [Choi et al. 1997; Fudenberg and Levine 1989; Houston 2003].
Such asymmetrical distribution of information reduces the credibility of the signals (about product quality and other
transaction related information) sent by sellers and hence, can lead to market malfunction or even market failure [Akerlof
1970].
Such a situation demands some sort of governance mechanism aimed at mitigating the risks faced by potential buyers
[Kollock 1999]. In fact a variety of governance mechanisms such as insurances (provided by the market provider) and
warranties do exist in OAMs. However, they impose an additional cost to the buyers, which is often not desired [Shapiro
1983], especially when the worth of the transaction is small. Therefore, reputation systems have been resorted to as a
mechanism to reduce information asymmetries [McDonald & Slawson 2002] that can be used by the buyers without
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incurring significant additional costs [Shapiro 1983]. The term reputation has been defined in different ways in different
studies [Houston 2003; Mailath and Samuelson 2001; Zacharia et al. 2000]. For the purposes of this study, reputation refers
to buyer’s estimation of consistency in seller’s behavior over a period of time over any given attribute such as integrity,
competence, etc. [Herbig et al. 1994].
With the growth in the OAMs, online C-2-C websites such as ebay.com, yahoo.com, and other market providers have set up
reputation mechanisms where by buyers and sellers provide feedbacks and rate each other based on their transaction related
experiences [Livingston 2002; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2001]. Feedbacks are specific to the parties involved in a particular
transaction and are classified into positive, negative or neutral feedbacks and the difference between the total number of
positive and negative feedbacks forms the seller’s net reputation rating [Standifird 2001]. Future buyers examine the
feedbacks and the net reputation ratings of sellers, with the objectives of reducing existing information asymmetries and
making better-informed decisions [Livingston 2002]. While extensive literature exists on the differential treatments received
by sellers with high and low reputation [Allen 1984; Klein and Leffler 1981; Livingston 2002; McDonald and Slawson 2002;
Melnik and Alm 2002; Shapiro 1983;], no study has systematically developed a classification of sellers in OAMs. Absence of
a comprehensive classification of a phenomenon being studied so widely restricts the prospects for systematically studying
the phenomenon and the opportunities for developing related theories. Therefore, in this paper we present a hierarchical
classification of sellers in OAMs that can facilitate systematic research. Subsequently, we (i) assess the classification using
the evaluative criteria provided by Hunt (1991), (ii) demonstrate the systemic power of the classification by providing a
sample propositional inventory, and (iii) discuss how the proposed classification can facilitate further theory building, while
accommodating current research.
SELLERS IN ONLINE AUCTION MARKETS: A CLASSIFICATION

Past research on the role of reputation in OAMs has focused on a number of important issues some of which have been
summarized in Figure 1.
While different groups of sellers such as new comers, sellers with positive or negative reputation, have been individually
identified in the literature, a review of the relevant literature reveals no standard classification of OAM sellers based on
feedbacks or reputation scores. Since classification schemata play a significant role in organizing phenomena into classes that
are amenable to systematic investigation and theory development (Hunt, 1991), we propose a classification of OAM sellers
that could potentially lead to substantive theoretical development, facilitate meaningful comparisons between different
groups of sellers, help in developing a holistic perspective about the impact of reputation on bid prices, and provide other
research opportunities. While recognizing that sellers can be categorized on the basis of product types, price range of the
products, homogeneity and heterogeneity of products, innocence and malice in intentions, etc., in this paper, we present a
parsimonious but adequate classification scheme of sellers based on feedbacks, since feedbacks and the reputation ratings
calculated based on feedbacks have been extensively studied as determinants of the prices and number of bids received by an
OAM seller. Since we are developing the classification “ a priori”, i.e., before analyzing any specific set of data, the
procedure employed here is called logical partitioning (Harvey 1969). Though the classification is not based on empirical
data, it is strongly based on past literature and findings in this area of research. This way of classifying schema is also called
“deductive classification” or “classification from above” (Hunt 1991).
Developing a classification schema involves three main steps: (i) specifying the phenomena to be categorized, (ii) delineating
the categorial term(s), which are properties of the phenomena on which the classification schema is to be based, and (iii)
labeling the various categories that emerge from applying the categorial terms to the phenomena (Hunt 1991). The
phenomenon that we are attempting to categorize is OAM sellers, based on feedback provided by unique registered users,
which is then used to calculate reputation ratings as the difference between the number of positive and negative feedbacks
(McDonald & Slawson 2002). More specifically, the classification is based on (i) type of feedbacks (positive, negative, or
neutral) that can be aggregated to obtain the reputation ratings of sellers, (ii) proportion of negative feedbacks, and (iii) nature
of negative feedbacks (feedbacks suggesting total loss or partial loss) that can be aggregated into proportion of negative
feedbacks suggesting partial or total loss. Based on the reputation ratings, sellers can be categorized into five different
groups: 1. Sellers with high positive reputation, 2. Sellers with average reputation, 3. Sellers with low positive reputation, 4.
Sellers with zero reputation, and 5. Sellers with negative reputation. However, we contend that reputation, as a simple
number may not tell the complete story. For example, if two sellers have a high positive reputation score of 100, they may be
perceived very differently by customers because seller A might have received 150 positive feedbacks and 50 negative
feedbacks while seller B might have received 1100 positive feedbacks and 1000 negative feedbacks. Hence, proportion of
negative feedbacks received should be included in the classification and therefore, each category in the classification can be
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further classified as sellers with high and low proportion of negative feedbacks. In addition, we propose that the nature of
negative feedbacks can affect the reputation of sellers. Within negative feedbacks, there could potentially be information
relating to total loss or partial loss. For instance, a negative feedback could be, “Sent money but did not receive the product”
or “product was totally damaged and was of no use to me!” Such feedbacks suggest that the buyer perceived total loss from
the transaction. On the other hand feedback could have been, “Received the book on time but one page was torn!” In this
case, the feedback does not suggest total loss but signifies buyer’s perception of partial loss, i.e., not getting everything
he/she expected from the transaction. Therefore, sellers can be further classified based on the nature of the feedbacks
received by them, and hence sellers can be with high or low proportion of negative feedbacks suggesting total loss or partial
loss. The procedure employed to create the classification has resulted in a hierarchical classification represented in figure 2.
The advantage of such a classification is that it has greater power in systematically organizing the phenomenon under
investigation (Hunt 1991). We now describe each category in the classification that was briefly introduced here.
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Level I: Categorization Based on Reputation Ratings

Most research in this research area has displayed a historical bias towards sellers with high and low reputation ratings. Given
that OAMs are relatively immature, there is a conspicuous presence and a constant influx of sellers with (i) low positive
reputation, (ii) zero reputation, and (iii) negative reputation. In this section, we discuss the various categories of sellers based
on their reputation ratings.
2.1.1 Sellers With High Positive Reputation

This group of sellers refers to those whose reputation ratings are greater than the average rating of sellers in a specified
product market. For example, if average ratings of sellers in a market for a particular product is 75, and a seller S has a rating
of 200, he will be considered as a seller with high positive reputation. Past research has shown that this group of sellers is the
most desired one and often receives high bids for their products [Livingston 2002; McDonald and Slawson 2002; Melnik and
Alm 2002].
2.1.2 Sellers With Average Reputation

Sellers with average reputation are those whose reputation ratings equal to the average ratings of sellers in that product
market. For example, if average ratings of sellers in a market for a particular product is 75, and a seller S has a rating of 75 or
a rating close to that number, he will be considered as a seller with average reputation. Average ratings can probably act as
the reputation ratings that a buyer can commonly expect in that particular product market.
2.1.3 Sellers With Low Positive Reputation

Sellers with a reputation rating significantly less than the average ratings of sellers in a specified product market are referred
to as sellers with low positive reputation. For example, if average ratings of sellers in a market for a particular product is 75,
and a seller S has a rating of 5, he will be considered as a seller with low positive reputation. This group of sellers would
include those sellers who are relatively new to the OAM itself, those who are old to the market itself but have sold very few
items during that period, those who have often not received feedbacks on the transactions carried over by them, or those who
have positive as well as negative feedbacks such that their net reputation rating is relatively lower than others.
2.1.4 Sellers With Zero Reputation

This group of sellers refers to those whose reputation score is equal to zero. This group of sellers might be composed of
different types of sellers. It includes (i) sellers with a transaction history but no feedbacks, (ii) sellers with a transaction
history but with equal number of positive as well as negative feedbacks, and (iii) sellers who are new comers to the OAM.
2.1.5 Sellers With Negative Reputation

This group refers to sellers whose net reputation score is less than zero, i.e. number of negative feedbacks is greater than the
number of positive feedbacks. In case of eBay, the reputation ratings of such sellers might range from –1 to –4. It cannot go
any lower as eBay removes sellers with lower scores from their OAM.
It is important to note that the proposed categorization uses the net reputation ratings of sellers to classify them into one of
the five categories mentioned above. However, the categorization is specific to a product market. For example, lets assume
that a seller’s reputation score is 50. When he attempts to sell a book, the average reputation score in that market could be
100 and hence, he could be treated as a seller with low positive reputation in that market. But when the same seller attempts
to sell a laptop, he might be considered as a seller with high positive reputation because the average reputation scores in that
market is 25. Thus, the categorization is flexible enough to accommodate the changing status of a seller.
Level II: Categorization Based on Proportion of Negative Feedbacks
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Each category of sellers in Level I can be further classified based on the proportion of negative feedbacks received by them.
This categorization is essential because two sellers with the same reputation rating might be treated differently depending on
the proportion of negative feedbacks received by them. That is, two sellers A and B with a reputation rating of 50 will be
treated differently if they have significantly different proportions of negative feedbacks, for instance, 1% and 45%
respectively. Other things being equal, its reasonable for anyone to choose seller A over B. Therefore, we further classify
sellers in each category in Level I, based on the proportion of negative feedbacks, as sellers with high proportion of negative
feedbacks and sellers with low proportion of negative feedbacks. Sellers with high proportion of negative feedbacks also
refer to sellers with low proportion of positive feedbacks and vice versa. Additionally, sellers with high proportion of positive
feedbacks include sellers with no negative feedbacks. Given the significant implications of negative feedbacks (Standifird
2001), we classify sellers in Level I based on proportion of negative feedbacks rather than the proportion of positive
feedbacks. For the purposes of this classification we classify sellers with 25% or a greater percent of negative feedbacks as
sellers with high proportion of negative feedback and sellers with 1% - 24% of negative feedbacks as sellers with low
proportion of negative feedback.
Level III: Categorization Based on Nature of the Feedback

Buyers are not likely to interpret all feedbacks simply as positive, negative or neutral feedbacks. Lets consider for instance
two positive feedbacks. 1. “Great seller, great transaction. Thank You!” 2. “Got what I wanted but delivery was late by a
week.” Though both are positive feedbacks they clearly do not suggest the same information about the sellers. In the first
case, the buyer is totally satisfied and hence perceives “total gain” whereas in the second case the buyer is not totally satisfied
and hence, perceives only “partial gain” that might vary in degree from buyer to buyer. Next lets consider two negative
feedbacks. 1. “Sent the money, did not get the product.” 2. “Got the product after one month!” In the first case, the buyer
perceives “total loss” since he did not get anything in return for his payment. In the second case, the buyer does get the
product but is not satisfied due to the delayed delivery and hence perceives “partial loss”. A close observation highlights the
similarity between partial loss and partial gain. The only difference between them is how the buyer perceived the case. If the
buyer classifies such a feedback as positive, it means he/she perceives the transaction to be a transaction fetching partial gain
or else he considers it to be a transaction resulting in partial loss. Therefore, based on the nature of the feedbacks, sellers can
be classified as sellers with high or low proportion of positive or negative feedbacks suggesting total or partial gain or total or
partial loss. However, according to Standifird (2001, p. 293), “… positive reputational rating emerged as only mildly
significant in determining the final bid price … whereas a negative reputational rating emerged as highly significant and
detrimental.” Therefore, we further classify sellers in level II as sellers with high proportion of negative feedbacks suggesting
total loss or partial loss. Sellers with 50% or more of negative feedbacks suggesting total loss are considered as sellers with
high proportion of negative feedbacks suggesting total loss else they are classified as sellers with negative feedbacks
suggesting high proportion of feedbacks suggesting partial loss.
Empty Classes

An important observation made relating to logical partitioning is the scope for empty classes (Hunt, 1991). According to
Hunt (1991, p. 180), “… proper application of categorial terms may generate a class to which no phenomenon belongs.” Our
classification has certain empty classes precisely for the reason suggested by Hunt (1991). Sellers with zero reputation can
either have equal number of positive and negative feedbacks or have no negative feedbacks. Similarly, sellers with net
negative ratings will always have more number of negative feedbacks than positive feedbacks. Therefore, sellers with zero or
negative reputation ratings can be further classified as sellers with high proportion of negative feedbacks but not as sellers
with low proportion of negative feedbacks and hence, the category of low proportion of negative feedbacks and its
subsequent classifications will be empty classes for sellers with zero or negative reputational ratings.
EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Although alternative classifications of sellers in OAMs are not available, we attempt to validate our classification by
evaluating it based on five important criteria provided by Hunt (1991)
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Does the schema adequately specify the phenomenon to be classified? As there seems to be a consensus among researchers
about the definition of an OAM seller, this schema does well on criterion 1 referring to what is being categorized.
Does the schema adequately specify the properties or characteristics that will be doing the classifying? Throughout the
classification, we uniformly use type of reputation scores, proportion of negative feedbacks, and nature of negative feedbacks
as categorial terms that form the basis of our classification. Hence, the scheme is structurally sound and does not produce
different and inconsistent systems of classes. Also, our classification procedures are inter-subjectively unambiguous, i.e.,
given our categorial terms different people would classify the phenomena into the same categories.
Does the schema have categories that are mutually exclusive? Since one seller who belongs to one category or class does not
fit into any other category or class at a given point in time in a given product market, all categories are mutually exclusive.
For example, a seller who belongs to high positive reputation class for one product does not fit into negative reputation class
for the same product at a given point in time.
Does the schema have categories that are collectively exhaustive? As every seller that needs to be classified does have a
home in our classification, our classification is collectively exhaustive.
Is the schema useful? Our classification is devised to explicate buyer behavior with reference to various sellers that are
present in OAMs. To the extent that our classification adequately classifies sellers and generates intellectual discourse for
further conceptual and empirical work, it is useful. We encourage researchers to critically evaluate our work toward a better
understanding of OAMs. Further, we further demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed conceptual model in the following
section.

A DEMONSTRATION OF THE SYSTEMIC POWER OF THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL: A PROPOSITIONAL INVENTORY

An important use of classifications is its ability to systematically generate meaningful propositions. A number of propositions
can be put forward based on the proposed classification of sellers in OAMs. Due to space limitations, we put forward five
interesting propositions that can be used to study how prospective buyers are likely to treat the different categories of less
desirable sellers (sellers with low positive reputation, sellers with zero reputation, and sellers with negative reputation).
Negative reputation increases the risks for potential buyers [Shapiro 1983]. Due to the negative signals sent by the negative
ratings, such sellers will have to sell their products at significantly lower prices when compared to new sellers who send no
signals about their credibility to the buyers. We propose that sending no signals is better than sending strong negative signals.
Thus,
Proposition One: Sellers with negative reputation are likely to receive lower prices on their products when compared to new
sellers, ceteris paribus.
Unlike sellers with negative reputation, sellers with low reputation send mixed signal to the buyers because they have both
positive and negative feedbacks. When compared, sellers with low reputation can be expected to send more desirable signals
than sellers with negative reputation. That is, other things being equal, buyers are likely to choose sellers with low reputation
over sellers with negative reputation.
Proposition Two (a): Sellers with negative reputation are likely to receive lower prices on their products when compared to
low reputation sellers who have received negative feedbacks significantly suggesting partial loss, ceteris paribus.
Proposition Two (b): Sellers with negative reputation are likely to receive lower prices on their products when compared to
low reputation sellers who have received negative feedbacks significantly suggesting total loss, ceteris paribus.
Empirical studies on sellers with low reputation show that such sellers receive lower bids because low reputation signals
reduced assurance of sellers completing transactions as contracted [Shapiro 1983]. Sellers with negative feedbacks
suggesting complete loss can be expected to send stronger negative signals to buyers about the seller’s credibility when
compared to sellers with negative feedbacks suggesting partial loss. Therefore, the effects of negative feedbacks suggesting
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total loss and partial loss are predicted to be unequal. Drawing from probability theory, we propose that buyers will place
greater negative weights on sellers with feedbacks suggesting total loss when compared to sellers with feedbacks suggesting
partial loss. Thus,
Proposition Three: Sellers with negative feedbacks suggesting total loss to the buyers are likely to receive lower prices when
compared to sellers with negative feedbacks significantly suggesting partial loss to the buyer, ceteris paribus.
While a seller with negative feedbacks suggesting total loss sends strong negative signals to the buyer, a new seller has no
means of sending any positive signal. In this case, buyers can either choose between sellers who are more likely to default or
choose sellers whose behavior is not much known and hence, there is a possibility that the buyer might honor the agreement.
Drawing from prospect theory, we argue that in cases of losses, individuals are willing to take chances and explore the
unknown. Therefore,
Proposition Four: New sellers are likely to receive better prices when compared to low reputation sellers with negative
feedbacks significantly suggesting total loss to the buyer, ceteris paribus.
While comparing low reputation sellers with negative feedbacks suggesting partial loss versus new sellers, buyers need to
choose between new sellers and sellers with low reputation. Since sellers with low reputation do have some positive
feedbacks and the negative feedbacks do not suggest total loss, it is more likely that buyers will choose them over new
buyers. Thus,
Proposition Five: Low reputation sellers with negative feedbacks significantly suggesting partial loss are likely to receive
better prices when compared to new sellers, ceteris paribus.
Next, with reference to accommodating current research and facilitating further theory building, we discuss some of the other
uses of our classification.
DISCUSSION

Given the relative immaturity of OAMs, there is immense scope for both empirical and conceptual work. Our endeavor, we
hope provides a small but significant thrust in that direction. Our work could lead intellectually stimulating researchers to
come up with newer classifications that could then be validated and to systematic empirical investigations using our
classification. Our classification also has important implications for practice. The process of developing the classification
highlighted the need for including information such as mean reputation scores in a product market as it can provide buyers
with useful information in evaluating a sellers’ reputation. It also draws attention towards more closely examining feedbacks
in terms of total and partial loss. Empirical studies in this area could have important implications for building more
sophisticated and useful reputation reporting systems.
It is important to note that our classification does not undermine the research that has been done so far. In fact, our
classification accommodates research that compares sellers with high and low reputation. In addition, our classification
highlights the need to pay greater attention to the process of reputation building by introducing sub-classes that could bring
greater explanatory power with reference to buyer behavior that reflects in number of bids and bid prices received by a seller.
As we have argued earlier in this article, classifications are important for developing good research traditions in our
discipline, because classifications are amenable to systematic investigation and thereby theory development. With our
proposed classification we have demonstrated that (i) new propositions and hypotheses concerning various categories can be
developed, (ii) a sound foundation that provides the basis for cumulative conceptual and empirical research can be provided,
and (iii) last but not the least, concept or theory driven work that could potentially stimulate the intellectual curiosity of
researchers can be initiated. Toward an intellectual discourse that can facilitate stronger theory-informed empirical research,
we wait!
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